DHAKA, July 8 (Alliance News): One year after mass protests toppled former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, Bangladesh’s foreign policy has entered a significant phase of realignment, distancing itself from long-time ally India and moving closer to China and Pakistan.
This diplomatic shift, driven by new political leadership and rising public sentiment, is shaping the country’s geopolitical strategy ahead of general elections next year.
The student-led protests of August 2024, which culminated in the storming of Sheikh Hasina’s residence, forced the former premier to flee to India via helicopter.
The interim government, led by Nobel Peace Prize laureate Muhammad Yunus, has since accused New Delhi of interfering in Bangladesh’s internal affairs by granting sanctuary to Hasina, who faces charges of crimes against humanity and has already been sentenced in absentia for contempt of court.
Prime Minister Yunus stated that public resentment over Hasina’s escape has been redirected toward India. His remarks reflect growing dissatisfaction within Dhaka over New Delhi’s role in protecting a controversial political figure.
Meanwhile, Bangladesh’s foreign ministry has confirmed that relations with India are now in a “readjustment phase.”
This changing geopolitical landscape has seen Bangladesh pivot toward China. In March 2025, Yunus made his first official state visit to Beijing, securing $2.1 billion in investment, loans, and grants. China has also increased its direct engagement with key political stakeholders in Bangladesh.
Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir, a senior figure in the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP)—widely seen as the frontrunner in upcoming elections—affirmed China’s commitment to working with the next elected government with “sincerity, steadfastness, love, and affection.”
India has expressed growing concern over these developments. Analysts in New Delhi warn that Bangladesh’s increased engagement with Beijing and Islamabad may compromise regional stability.
Praveen Donthi of the International Crisis Group remarked that India has “probably never experienced such intense strain” in its relations with Bangladesh.
He also noted that India’s ruling political leadership is unlikely to accept a Dhaka government perceived as Islamist or unfriendly to Indian interests.
In a further display of shifting allegiances, Bangladesh and Pakistan—nations with a tumultuous history following the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War—have resumed trade via sea and are planning direct flight connections.
Talks held in China in June between officials from Dhaka, Islamabad, and Beijing resulted in agreements on cooperation in trade, education, agriculture, and industrial development.
China’s growing influence is also evident in healthcare collaboration. With India restricting access for Bangladeshi medical tourists, China has designated three hospitals for Bangladeshi patients, reflecting a strategic soft power play.
Professor Obaidul Haque of Dhaka University noted that China’s support in healthcare and other services has “borne fruit” amid Dhaka’s diplomatic shift.
Trade tensions between India and Bangladesh are also mounting. India has placed curbs on Bangladeshi exports such as jute, garments, and plastics, prompting reciprocal measures from Dhaka. Despite ongoing trade, diplomatic relations remain strained.
Former Bangladeshi Ambassador to the U.S., Md Humayun Kabir, emphasized the need for a balanced foreign policy, urging Dhaka to strengthen “multilateral relations” to avoid dependency on any single power. “The warmth is gone, but cooperation still exists,” he said.
Meanwhile, Bangladesh has also sought to strengthen ties with the United States. Affected by the trade imbalance created by tariffs under former President Donald Trump, Dhaka is looking to buy Boeing aircraft and boost imports of U.S. wheat, cotton, and oil.
In June, Yunus reaffirmed his administration’s desire to deepen ties with Washington during talks with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio.
Despite these efforts, experts warn that regional tensions will not subside soon. Bangladesh’s improving ties with China and Pakistan—especially after the recent flare-up between India and Pakistan in Kashmir—have further isolated New Delhi.
Over 70 people were killed during four days of conflict in May following a deadly militant attack in Indian Illegally Occupied Jammu and Kashmir.
In this volatile environment, India’s reluctance to engage with Bangladesh’s interim leadership is likely to continue until after the 2025 elections.
According to Donthi, India may reassess its stance only if elections in Bangladesh result in a government perceived as aligned with Indian interests. Until then, the diplomatic freeze is expected to persist.
“There may be attempts to undermine rather than collaborate with the current government,” he warned.
Bangladesh, a nation of 170 million people, stands at a crossroads. With elections looming, the country’s new foreign policy posture is redefining its position in South Asia.
As it forges deeper ties with China and Pakistan while managing strained relations with India, Dhaka must carefully navigate its diplomatic strategy to protect its national interests without becoming a pawn in broader regional rivalries.
